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Online Sports Betting: The Opportunities and Risks for
Banks
I. INTRODUCTION
Sports betting has existed almost as long as sports themselves,
with ancient Romans placing wagers on the results of chariot races at the
Circus Maximus centuries ago.1 Sports betting is the process of allowing
individuals to place wagers on the outcomes of specific sporting events.2
For many years sports betting was illegal in the United States due to the
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 (“PASPA”),3
which prohibited states from legalizing the process. 4 However, in 2018
this act was found unconstitutional in the decision of Murphy v. National
Collegiate Athletic Association.5 Since this ruling, there has been a
proliferation of legalization among the states, with twenty-two legalizing
sports betting as of 2020.6
Today, sports betting is a popular American pastime with $20
billion in bets placed since 2018,7 and a sports betting industry projected
to be worth $8 billion by 2025.8 There have been pushes for further
legalization across the nation, with a 2017 survey indicating that 55% of
1. The circus maximus was the main chariot track in the middle of Rome where the highest
level of chariot racing took place. Mark Cartwright, Circus Maximus, ANCIENT HIST.
ENCYCLOPEDIA
(May
16,
2018)
https://www.ancient.eu/Circus_Maximus/ [https://perma.cc/3G42-WN5P].
2. Ed Grabianowaski, How Sports Betting Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS,
https://entertainment.howstuffworks.com/sports-betting.htm [https://perma.cc/DK3J-UN36]
(last visited Sept. 19, 2020).
3. Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 (“PASPA”), 28 U.S.C. §§
3701–3704 (2018).
4. Id.
5. Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1484–85 (2018).
6. Ryan Rodenberg, United States of Sports Betting: An Updated Map of Where Every
State Stands, ESPN (June 9, 2020), https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/19740480/theunited-states-sports-betting-where-all-50-states-stand-legalization [https://perma.cc/V7MCFZ72].
7. David Purdum, Sports Betting’s Growth in U.S. ‘Extraordinary’, ESPN (May 14, 2020)
https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/29174799/sports-betting-growth-us-extraordinary
[https://perma.cc/PZ93-HZLD].
8. Associated Press, Sports Betting Market Expected to Reach $8 Billion by 2025,
MARKETWATCH (Nov. 4, 2019, 3:42 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/firms-saysports-betting-market-to-reach-8-billion-by-2025-2019-1104#:~:text=NEW%20YORK%20(AP)%20%E2%80%94%20Investors,the%20U.S.%20with
in%20five%20years [https://perma.cc/B8KT-3YRM].
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the American public supports legalization.9 However, the banking
industry does not share the same positive opinions towards sports betting
as the American public, as many financial institutions still refuse to offer
their services to the sports betting industry.10 This refusal is primarily
due to fears of being fined for assisting in money laundering, as sports
betting has been previously used to cover up money laundering schemes
prior to PASPA.11 There is significant risk to their cautious approach
because the sports betting industry is growing rapidly and the banks that
act first will protect their current customer base while also capitalizing on
new revenue streams.12
For many years, sports betting was illegal in the United States on
account of the PASPA.13 This all changed in 2018 with the Supreme
Court decision, Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association.14
This decision found that PASPA was unconstitutional under the Tenth
Amendment,15 giving the states the ability to choose their own paths
forward regarding whether or not they wanted to create legalized sports
betting regimes.16 Since this decision, there has been a surge in different
regulatory schemes aimed at legalizing sports betting among the various
states.17

9. Rick Maese & Emily Guskin, Poll: For First Time, Majority of Americans Approve of
Legalizing
Sports
Betting,
WASH.
POST
(Sep.
26,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/poll-for-first-time-majority-of-americans-approveof-legalizing-sports-betting/2017/09/26/a18b97ca-a226-11e7-b14ff41773cd5a14_story.html [https://perma.cc/G74W-Q63A].
10. See Amanda Alix, Bank of America Says "Yes" to Pot, "No" to Online Casinos, THE
MOTLEY FOOL (Nov. 24, 2013, 9:22 AM) (exploring how banks came to interact with the
cannabis
industry
as
well
as
online
casinos)
https://www.fool.com/investing/general/2013/11/24/bank-of-america-says-yes-to-pot-no-toonline-casin.aspx [https://perma.cc/8XDS-XNAC].
11. Jon Prior, Banks Steer Clear of Sports Gambling Even as More States Legalize It, AM.
BANKER (Nov. 11, 2020, 9:00 PM) https://www.americanbanker.com/news/banks-steerclear-of-sports-gambling-even-as-more-states-legalizeit#:~:text=While%20banks%20are%20more%20open,be%20used%20for%20online%20wa
gers.&text=Even%20with%20the%20regulatory%20concerns,in%20the%20industry%20is
%20enticing [https://perma.cc/7WJZ-23S3].
12. See Kevin Wack, Sports Gambling is Next Hot-Button Issue for Banks, AM. BANKER
(May. 15 2018, 2:10 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/just-what-banks-needanother-hot-button-issue-in-sports-gambling [https://perma.cc/Y965-KSZP] (arguing that
banks may lose customers and ceded opportunity for revenue by not getting involved with
sports betting).
13. Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 (“PASPA”), 28 U.S.C. §§
3701–3704 (2018).
14. Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1484–85 (2018).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Rodenberg, supra note 6.
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During all of this, banks have remained wary of sports betting and
many have not yet decided whether they wish to do business with sports
betting operators.18 In this way, banks have avoided the fledgling
industry in the same way they have avoided the growing cannabis
industry, another industry being legalized at the state level after a long
period of illegality everywhere.19 However, unlike the cannabis industry,
which has the unmitigable risk of federal intervention,20 the risk of money
laundering in sports betting can be reduced by state action.21 Because of
this, banks should focus on what states and sportsbooks are doing to
mitigate the risk of money laundering rather than waiting for the risk to
fully eliminated.22
This Note proceeds in six parts. Part II describes the history of
sports betting in the United States and how Murphy upended that system
and left regulation up to the states. Part III explores federal anti-money
laundering law and the effect it has on the sports betting industry. Part
IV examines the cannabis industry and the reaction banks have had to
legalization by the states, as well as how the cannabis and sports betting
industries are different. Part V considers some of the current regulations
and industry practices that protect online sports betting from the negative
issues associated with gambling. Finally, Part VI provides a brief
conclusion of why banks should not treat sports betting the same as they
do cannabis.
II. SPORTS BETTING: WHAT IT IS, HOW IT DEVELOPED, AND WHERE IT IS
GOING
A.

The Mechanics of Sports Betting

At its core, sports betting is the act of placing a wager on who
will win a sporting event.23 Today, however, people are able to bet on all
18. Wack, supra note 12.
19. See Alix, supra note 10 (exploring how banks came to interact with the cannabis

industry as well as online casinos).
20. See 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11 (2020) (making cannabis illegal to own under federal law,
which means the market could be shut down at any time).
21. See e.g., 230 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/25-25 (2020) (providing all the protections Illinois
requires from sports betting); see also 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN § 42-61.2-16 (2020) (adding
sports betting to the list of activities under the eye of the Rhode Island Lottery).
22. See Why We Won’t See a Federal Sports Betting Bill Soon, IFRAHLAW (July 30, 2018)
https://www.ifrahlaw.com/ifrah-on-igaming/wont-see-federal-sports-betting-bill-soon/
[https://perma.cc/F2PM-KP73] (explaining the reasons why a federal response will take a
long time).
23. Grabianowski, supra note 2.
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aspects of the event, such as the particular score, participant performance,
and even the first participant to get a foul. 24 Bets are created by
oddsmakers, individuals who use previous matches’ statistics to create
odds.25 These odds are then made into a bet when they are offered to the
public by a bookmaker who is working for a casino or other betting
provider.26 The odds are not the oddsmaker’s prediction of what will
occur but are actually an oddsmaker’s prediction of what bet is most
likely to get the same amount of people on each side of the bet.27 Sports
betting operators make their money by taking a small fee for their
services. 28 As sports betting has progressed, bets have grown more
sophisticated, with many bookmakers now responsible for drawing up the
spreads on sporting events, which allows people to bet on a sporting event
between two mismatched teams.29 Bookmakers are also tasked with
creating parlay bets, which are a collection of minor bets that all must be
correct to payout.30
B.

History of Sports Betting and the Federal Ban

In the United States, sports betting has had a long and often
unsavory history.31 Perhaps the most infamous sports betting event is the
“Black Sox” Scandal,32 in which eight members of the Chicago White
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See generally Richard Johnson, The Centuries-Old History of How Sports Betting

Became Illegal in the United States in the First Place, SB NATION, (May 18, 2018, 8:00 AM)
https://www.sbnation.com/2018/5/18/17353994/sports-betting-illegal-united-states-why
[https://perma.cc/6NEL-8LU5] (exploring the long standing history of sports betting and the
drive to make it illegal).
32. The Black Sox Scandal concerned eight members of the Chicago White Sox baseball
team, who allegedly threw the World Series against the Cincinnati Reds after the Sox were
favored as much as 3-to-1 before the series. There have been extensive discussions about
how involved eight players were in the fix. Some have claimed the Sox tried to rally with one
game left in the series but ultimately continued the fix because of threats to their families.
The scandal may have remained rumors forever, until one of the gamblers, Bill Mahrag, went
public with his account of the fix that led to the testimony of the players before a grand jury.
Surprisingly, they were never convicted in court because all the grand jury testimony papers
were stolen before trial, leaving the prosecution with no evidence. In any event, Judge Landis,
who had just been appointed the commissioner of baseball, handed down an internal decision
of a lifetime ban for each player. Since then, there has been much discussion around whether
the players should be allowed to finally, enter the hall of fame but nothing has ever come of
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Sox were accused of throwing the 1919 World Series after allegedly
being paid off by the New York mobster Arnold Rothstein.33 Although
none of the players were found guilty of a crime at trial, all were
permanently banned from professional baseball.34 After this scandal, no
state would endorse or legalize sports betting in any form until 1955,
when Nevada created a state gaming board and began to accept wagers
on sporting events.35 Such scandals have persisted even after PASPA
was passed: in 2007 the National Basketball Association (“NBA”)
discovered that one of its referees, Tim Donaghy, had been making bets
for years on sporting events that he had officiated. 36 Donaghy had also
worked on behalf of a professional sports gambler to influence both the
outcome of the event and the actual scores for each team, earning $2,000
for each event he influenced.37 Eventually, the scheme fell apart, and
Donaghy was arrested. 38 These types of incidents that demonstrated how
sports betting could potentially lead to rigged games created the negative
perceptions that influenced public perception for many years. 39 Scandals
like the Black Sox and Tim Donaghy exemplify the harm to competitive
integrity that Congress leveraged in banning sports betting following a
1989 breach of integrity with Major League Baseball (“MLB”) star Pete
Rose.40 In response to the Rose situation, and with broad support from
the professional sports leagues, 41 Congress decided to act and in 1992
PASPA was signed into law.42

it. To this day this scandal remains one of the most publicized accounts of gambling can
influence the outcome of a professional match. See Evan Andrews, The Black Sox Baseball
Scandal, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/news/the-black-sox-baseball-scandal-95-yearsago [https://perma.cc/S9NF-8J9X] (last updated Oct. 22, 2018).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See James C. W. Goodall, Bringing Down the House: An Examination of the Law and
Policy Underpinning the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992, 67
RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1097, 1103 n.25 (2015) (“Nevada created a state gaming board and
authorized sports wagering in standalone locations.”).
36. Scott Eden, How Former Ref Tim Donaghy Conspired to Fix NBA Games, ESPN (July
9, 2020), https://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/25980368/how-former-ref-tim-donaghyconspired-fix-nba-games [https://perma.cc/5L6D-ZY8G].
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See id. (“[T]he more money there is inflowing to sport, the greater the sport
corruption.”).
40. See Goodall, supra note 35, at 1101–04 (previewing what came before PASPA as well
as what was discussed during the formation of the legislation).
41. S. REP. NO. 102–248 at 3 (1991).
42. See Goodall, supra note 35, at 1103 (Reviewing the two precursor bills to PAPSA that
took aim at state sports lotteries).
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PASPA outlawed any state from authorizing sports gambling on
both the professional and amateur level throughout the United States. 43
There were a few exceptions, including allowing existing sports betting
systems in Nevada, Delaware, Montana, and Oregon to continue44 and
providing safe harbors for two specific sports—horse racing and jai alai.45
The most crucial exception allowed any state to authorize sports betting
within one year of PASPA’s enactment. 46 However, a state could only
authorize sports betting within a municipality that had operated casino
gaming for at least ten years prior to PASPA and was the only
municipality allowed to operate casinos in the state’s constitution.47 This
extremely narrow exception was crafted to only apply to Atlantic City,
New Jersey.48 The state of New Jersey, however, was unable to pass
sports betting legislation within one year and was unable to qualify for
the carve out.49
C.

Market and Public Response to PASPA

While sports betting outside of these exempted states was illegal
under PASPA, the market for sports wagering continued to evolve. 50
When PASPA was first enacted in 1992, public perception of sports
betting was predominately negative, with 56% of Americans

43. Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 (“PASPA”), 28 U.S.C. §§
3701–3704 (2018).
44. The only states which this covered were Nevada, Oregon, Montana, and Delaware. See
id. § 3704. (allowing for games to continue in places where there were already established
regimes).
45. Id. (allowing for betting on horse races and the little-known sport of jai-alai).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Ryan Rodenberg, Sports Betting Myth Busters: All of New Jersey Could Have Been
Exempt From PASPA’S Ban, LEGAL SPORTS REP., (last updated Jan. 8, 2018)
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/17271/sports-betting-mythbusters-nj-and-paspa/
[https://perma.cc/6QKJ-3N7W].
49. See N.J. Gov. Chris Christie: "Let Them Try to Stop Us" from Sports Betting, CBS
(May 25, 2012, 1:02 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/nj-gov-chris-christie-let-themtry-to-stop-us-from-sports-betting/ [https://perma.cc/DYE6-JLZL] (exploring the challenges
that New Jersey was bringing against PASPA, including why such challenges were necessary
after getting a statutory carve out originally).
50. Adam Silver, Opinion, Legalize and Regulate Sports Betting, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/14/opinion/nba-commissioner-adam-silverlegalize-sports-betting.html [https://perma.cc/5HCF-96FK]; see also Bret McCormick, Rise
of Fantasy Football Played a Big Part in League’s Growth, SPORTS BUS. J., (Sept. 2, 2019)
https://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2019/09/02/Media/Fantasy.aspx
[https://perma.cc/5SW5-2ZZC] (examining how perception shifted in the population and the
growth of betting alternatives began); Maese, supra note 9.
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disapproving of its legalization.51 By 2017, however, that perception had
shifted to 55% of Americans now in favor of legalizing some form of
sports betting.52 Furthermore, in stark contrast to prior testimony before
the Senate Judiciary Committee when PASPA was being considered by
Congress, the NBA reversed course and began to advocate for regulated
sports betting.53 While other leagues were not willing to go as far as the
NBA, in 2015 MLB’s commissioner also began to publicly comment on
reassessing the league’s existing position on sports betting.54
In the absence of legal sports betting options, many consumers
began to turn to fantasy sports.55 Fantasy sports involve participants
putting in a few dollars to form a pot and then selecting professional
athletes from real teams to create a fantasy team on paper. 56 A fantasy
team scores points based on how well the players that were “drafted”
perform in any real games they play.57 The fantasy participants then track
their players for an entire season and at the end distribute the pot
depending on which fantasy team performed the best.58 The rise of
fantasy sports was encouraged after a 2002 study found that fantasy
sports participants watched more football than non-fantasy participants.59
Indeed the National Football League (“NFL”) began to actively promote
fantasy sports by creating their own licensed fantasy league. 60 The
primary growth in the fantasy sports market was driven by daily fantasy
sports (“DFS”), which shortens the length from a season to a single
weekend or day of games. 61 DFS works the same as traditional fantasy
51. Maese, supra note 9.
52. Id.
53. Compare Silver, supra note 50 (providing support for the legalization of sports betting

from the perspective of the professional sports leagues) with S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 3
(testifying in support of the bill which would become PASPA).
54. David Purdum, MLB to Talk Betting with Owners, ESPN (Feb. 5, 2015),
https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/12286521/mlb-commissioner-rob-manfred-sayslegalized-sports-betting-needs-fresh-consideration [https://perma.cc/M8RP-HGBZ].
55. Fantasy sports consist of people drafting players to make up fantasy teams to compete
against each other. The better that a player statistically does in an individual match, the more
points the fantasy team owner will get for that week. Joseph Stromberg, Fantasy Football,
Explained for Non-Football Fans, VOX, https://www.vox.com/2014/8/15/6003131/fantasyfootball-how-to-play-draft-rankings [https://perma.cc/L2H3-G8KW] (last updated Aug. 24,
2015, 10:15 AM).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Christian Rigg, What are Daily Fantasy Sports?, TECHRADAR (March 11, 2020),
https://www.techradar.com/news/what-are-daily-fantasysports#:~:text=Daily%20fantasy%20sports%20are%20a%20subset%20of%20fantasy%20sp
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sports but with teams drafted every day rather than every season. 62 The
two largest providers of DFS are DraftKings and FanDuel.63 The two
companies have worked hard establishing themselves; at one point,
between the two companies, they were airing a national advertisement
every ninety seconds.64
D.

Demise of PASPA and Proliferation of Sports Betting

While the world changed rapidly around it, PASPA remained
relatively unchallenged for many years,65 and sports betting was relegated
to the sports halls of Nevada, while DFS grew as the favored sports-based
gaming pastime.66 This changed in 2011 when New Jersey put sports
betting on the ballot in a referendum to legalize sports betting in Atlantic
City casinos.67 After the referendum was approved by 64% of its voters,
New Jersey passed the New Jersey Sports Wagering Law. 68 The
professional sports leagues moved fast and sought an injunction in an
effort to void the law, eventually leading to NCAA v. Christie.69 In this
case, the federal district court held that PASPA did not violate the Tenth
Amendment—which reserves all power not delegated to the federal
government for the states—and that the New Jersey law was
impermissible,70 a decision upheld on appeal by the United States Court

orts%20betting,team%20selection%2C%20betting%20and%20prizes
[https://perma.cc/94WL-K8RQ].
62. Id.
63. Legal US Online Sports Betting and Mobile Betting Apps, PLAYUSA,
https://www.playusa.com/sports-betting/ [https://perma.cc/TXK5-TAH4] (last visited Sept.
19, 2020).
64. See David Purdum, Public’s Biggest Issue with DFS Industry, ESPN (Feb. 17, 2016),
https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/14791813/daily-fantasy-origin-hatred-daily-fantasysports [https://perma.cc/3FBQ-6NZ9] (explaining how public perception has changed in
regard to DFS and what they do that makes people dislike them).
65. See OFC Comm Baseball v. Markell, 579 F.3d 293, 294 (3d Cir. 2009) (discussing how
Delaware tried to expand on their sports betting in 2009, but the 3rd circuit held that PASPA
(1) barred parts of the proposed system and (2) preempted expansion of the legacy program
of exclusive NFL parlays).
66. See Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 (“PASPA”), 28 U.S.C. §§
3701–3704 (2018) (allowing sports betting in Nevada, as well as a few other states that
previously hosted certain types of sports betting).
67. N.J. Gov. Chris Christie: "Let Them Try to Stop Us" from Sports Betting, supra note
49.
68. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12A-1, et seq. (2012).
69. NCAA v. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551, 555 (D.N.J. 2013), aff'd sub nom. NCAA v.
Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013).
70. Id.
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of Appeals for the Third Circuit.71 After Christie, New Jersey sought to
allow sports betting by removing all restrictions on sports betting because
PASPA’s language prevents authorization.72
However, this
interpretation of the statute was again rejected by the Third Circuit73
leading to the Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy.74 The Court
disagreed with the Third Circuit and found that PASPA violated the
anticommandeering provision of the Tenth Amendment, which prohibits
the federal government from compelling state actors to enforce federal
law.75 While, traditionally, the anticommandeering provision was
applied to issues where the federal government was requiring state action,
the Court found that a prohibition on state action would fall within the
purview just the same.76 Without the primary ban in place, the Court
found that none of the provisions of PASPA were severable and rendered
the entire law void.77
Many states reacted swiftly following the 2018 decision in
Murphy, with twenty-two states and D.C. legalizing sports betting by the
end of 2020.78 Without a central model to follow, states adopted different
approaches to regulating sports betting.79 One of the primary differences
between these approaches is the decision of whether to allow online
sports betting.80 Despite the fact that online sports betting could
theoretically occur anywhere in the world, all states which currently have
allowed for online sports betting have also limited it to their own
borders.81 In total, ten states allow for some variation of mobile sports
betting off the premises of a licensed casino.82 An eleventh state,
71. NCAA v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208, 241 (3d Cir. 2013), abrogated
by Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
72. See Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct 1461, 1473 (2018) (explaining the history of the case
up to the Supreme Court).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 1478.
76. Id.
77. Id. (“[W]e hold that no provision of PASPA is severable from the provision directly at
issue in these cases.”).
78. These states are: Oregon, Nevada, Montana, Colorado, New Mexico, Iowa, Arkansas,
Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Indiana, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, New York,
New Jersey, Delaware, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire. Legal US Online Sports Betting
and Mobile Betting Apps, supra note 63.
79. See id. (detailing which states allow betting and what type).
80. Id. (listing which states mobile betting is allowed and how it may be performed).
81. See, e.g., 230 ILL. COMP. STAT 45/25-25 (requiring certain protections for online sports
betting to ensure it occurs within the state).
82. See Legal US Online Sports Betting and Mobile Betting Apps, supra note 63 (describing
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Rhode Island, Iowa, Oregon, Indiana, Illinois,
Colorado, Nevada).
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Mississippi, offers mobile betting but only on the premises of a physical
casino.83
Currently, all states that allow mobile betting still require that it
be tied to a physical casino, meaning that all online sportsbooks must
operate under the gaming license of a current physical location even if
the sportsbook does not offer in person services.84 DraftKings and
FanDuel are the biggest casino partners, with at least one of these two
industry giants operating in every state with legalized mobile betting,
aside from Oregon and Rhode Island.85 Their domination of the
marketplace has provided the closest thing to uniform regularity in the
industry, as these two giants provide most of the bookmakers in the
United States.86
Sports betting between states can look very different, particularly
in regards to registering an account to access online betting, with some
states requiring in-person activation before an account may be used.87 In
states which restrict sports betting to physical casinos, DraftKings and
FanDuel do not have the same type of presence, as they are only able to
offer DFS.88 Banks that wish to work with sports betting operators need
to be aware of the state regulatory framework applicable to their
customers.89
III. FEDERAL ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING LAW
With the end of PASPA, there is no longer any federal law that
limits state-based sports betting, whether online or in-person.90 Yet
despite this, many banks have decided to wait for federal action before
engaging with the industry.91 The primary reason that banks have been
unwilling to move forward is the fear of being tied up in a money

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. (explaining how Oregon offers their own mobile betting through the state lottery

and Rhode Island offers their own sportsbook through the UK provider International Game
Technology).
86. See Andrew Bary, Online Gambling Booms in N.J., Lifting DraftKings’ Stock,
BARRONS (June 15, 2020), https://www.barrons.com/articles/online-gambling-booms-in-n-jlifting-draftkings-stock-51592236341 [https://perma.cc/36V4-SRJA] (holding market shares
of 43% for Fanduel and 38% for DraftKings in NJ alone).
87. Legal US Online Sports Betting and Mobile Betting Apps, supra note 63.
88. Id.
89. See Wack, supra note 12 (advising banks to start charting a course due to the amount
of money that may be in play soon).
90. See, e.g., Federal Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2018).
91. Prior, supra note 11.
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laundering scandal.92 At the federal level, there are still an array of antimoney laundering laws that keep banks waiting on the sidelines.93 Some
of these laws, such as the Wire Act 94 and the Unlawful Internet Gambling
Enforcement Act (“UIGEA”), 95 are avoided by the structuring of
sportsbook operations in individual states.96 The Wire Act prohibits the
use of wire communication97 for the interstate transmission of bets.98 The
states have been able to do this by restricting all gambling, even online,
to be permitted only within the borders of the state. 99 The UIGEA
prohibits any gambling entity from accepting payment that (1) came
through the internet and (2) is in violation of any federal or state law. 100
Because sportsbooks begin operation in individual states in accordance
with new local laws, no law is being broken and the UIGEA is avoided.101
Unlike the Wire Act or UIGEA, the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”)102
is an anti-money laundering statute that is not limited to interstate
commerce or reliant on another law to trigger, meaning it is the only
federal law that has not been completely bypassed by the states.103 The
BSA requires financial institutions to report two different things: cash
transactions over $10,000 in a single day and any suspicious activity.104
Suspicious activity is a broad array of conduct but industry experts agree
it can include things such as bulk transactions, transactions consistently
below reporting thresholds, sudden bursts in low-activity accounts, or
dealing between unconnected businesses just to name a few. 105 Banks
can be held liable for partner organizations’ money laundering activity,
which has led to many banks acting as secondary enforcers of their casino
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1951–1959 (2018).
94. Federal Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084.
95. 31 U.S.C. § 5361 et seq (2018).
96. See, e.g., 230 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 45/25-25 (requiring all gambling to take place within

the state if it occurs online).
97. A wire communication is any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use
of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like
connection between the point of origin and the point of reception (including the use of such
connection in a switching station) furnished or operated by any person engaged in providing
or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign communications or
communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C § 2510(1) (2018).
98. Federal Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084.
99. See e.g., § 45/25-25 (restricting all online gambling to within the state’s borders).
100. 31 U.S.C § 5361 et seq.
101. Id.
102. 12 U.S.C. § 1951–1959 (2018).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Diana Byron, Suspicious Activity Reporting for Dummies 8 (Alison Maclean eds.,
2013).
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partners’ anti-money laundering programs by reviewing their procedures
and practices to make sure there are no vulnerabilities. 106 Additionally,
the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network has indicated its intent to
police sports betting just as closely as normal casino functions.107
However, many states and sports betting companies are taking steps to
mitigate this risk in the hopes of assuaging bank’s fears.108
Historical suggestions for alleviating the burden banks face
included the possibility of adding a safe harbor for any bank that
unknowingly helps perpetrate money laundering.109 In 2001 Senator
John McCain from Arizona suggested protecting any financial institution
that is unknowingly involved in internet gambling, which in this way
would protect from any penalty under the Wire Act.110 However this
suggestion, and others like it,111 never progressed,112 and there has been
no ease in the diligence expected from banks in combating money
laundering.113 This lack of federal action has left many banks waiting on
the sidelines, despite the massive amount of growth in sports betting.114
While the money laundering risk continues, sports betting is
growing at an astounding rate.115 This has encouraged some banks to
bide their time, but the pace of sports betting legalization at the state level
is picking up steam quickly.116 In 2020, that number has risen by seven
states to include a total of twenty-five states, including three due to ballot

106. Peter Rudegeair & Brett Wolf, Regulators Pushing Banks to Rid Casinos of MoneyLaundering, REUTERS (Aug. 15, 2014, 1:21 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bankscasinos-analysis/regulators-pushing-banks-to-rid-casinos-of-money-launderingidUSKBN0GF0BV20140815 [https://perma.cc/WD9H-UJK2].
107. Kenneth Blanco, Prepared Remarks of FinCEN Director Kenneth A. Blanco,
Delivered at the 12th Annual Las Vegas Anti-Money Laundering Conference, (Aug. 13, 2019)
https://www.fincen.gov/news/speeches/prepared-remarks-fincen-director-kenneth-blancodelivered-12th-annual-las-vegas-anti [https://perma.cc/5DWB-62SU].
108. See 230 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 45/25-25 (providing all the protections Illinois requires
from sports betting), See also 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-61.2-16 (2020) (adding sports
betting to the list of activities under the eye of the Rhode Island Lottery); See e.g., How
DraftKings Keeps Onboarding Security Swift and Out of Sight, PYMNTS (Apr. 23, 2019),
https://www.pymnts.com/digital-onboarding/2019/draftkings-sports-betting-identityverification-security/ [https://perma.cc/L2YW-9NSS] (exploring what companies are doing
to mitigate money laundering).
109. Amateur Sports Integrity Act, S. 718, 107th Cong. (2001).
110. Id.
111. Unlawful Internet Gambling Funding Prohibition Act, H.R. 556 107th Cong. § 3(e)
(2001).
112. S. Rep. No. 107-16, at 12.
113. Prior, supra note 11.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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referendums.117 Additionally, the COVID-19 pandemic has seen an
additional surge in online sports betting, providing states with more
betting-related tax revenue than they expected118 at a time when tax
receipts from other sources dropped significantly. 119
If banks seek to do business in the sports betting industry, the
biggest change they must make will be to allow customers to transfer their
funds from their bank accounts to betting accounts held by the
sportsbook.120 Because banks have been wary of sports betting, they have
not allowed credit card companies to offer their services in funding a
bettor’s account.121 While some bank transfers occur,122 many of the
biggest banks still prohibit their customers from making transfers to a
sports betting account.123 As banks prevent their customers from making
online transfers, banks force players to either not make bets or to switch
to another provider who is willing to do business with bookmakers.124
Additionally, banks should not just hope that customers will be satisfied
with on-site betting only.125 Mobile betting, in particular, draws in
significantly more players, with early reports suggesting that two-thirds
of wagers were being made on a mobile application.126 As online sports
betting grows, banks need to act quickly to ensure they do not lose
customers.127

117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Liz Farmer, Covid-19 Has Cost States $31 Billion In Tax Revenue—And That’s Just

The
Beginning,
FORBES
(Oct.
15,
2020,
8:30
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/lizfarmer/2020/10/15/covid-19-has-cost-states-31-billion--and-thats-just-the-beginning/?sh=474b612b2790 [https://perma.cc/N448-PQ5T].
120. See Wack, supra note 12 (explaining how banks are wary of involving themselves
with sports betting).
121. See Wack, supra note 12 (“If credit card companies dip their toes into these waters,
they will need to monitor customer activity closely for signs of problem gambling.”).
122. Prior, supra note 11 (“While banks are more open to clearing in-person betting
transactions, the hope in the gaming industry is that as more states legalize sports gambling,
more financial companies will begin to allow their cards to be used for online wagers.”).
123. Id.
124. See Wack, supra note 12 (“But if banks decide to ban sports gambling on their cards,
they will risk alienating many good customers.”).
125. See John T. Holden, Regulating Sports Wagering, 105 IOWA L. REV. 575, 612-13
(2020) (explaining how online sports betting draws in far more players).
126. Id.
127. See Wack, supra note 12 (“But if banks decide to ban sports gambling on their cards,
they will risk alienating many good customers.”).
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IV. SPORTS BETTING IS NOT RELIANT ON FEDERAL ACTION LIKE
CANNABIS
While sports betting continues to be legalized at the state level,
many banks have decided to not engage with the industry. 128 Despite this
patient approach, federal action, including a safe harbor, seems unlikely
to occur any time soon.129 Even in the face of federal inaction, many
banks still view the sports betting industry as too risky, often comparing
it to the cannabis industry.130 Like sports betting, the cannabis industry
has grown quickly in recent years in reaction to legislative and regulatory
changes at the state level.131 Prior to these changes, both industries were
illegal for a long time at the federal level, 132 and indeed cannabis still is
despite the state legalization.133 Additionally, both industries have been
shunned by banks despite the recent proliferation of legalization at the
state level.134 These similarities have resulted in many banks asking for
a similar safe harbor to be created in both industries at the federal level
before they will get involved in either.135 While the similarities between
cannabis and sports betting make it appealing to treat them both the same
way, the differences between the industries require a more nuanced
approach.136 The key distinction between assessing bank activity in the
cannabis industry versus bank activity in the sports betting industry is that
cannabis remains illegal under federal law 137 while sports betting is
currently entirely left up to the states and no longer subject to any
overriding federal prohibition.138

128. Id.
129. See Why We Won’t See A Federal Sports Betting Bill Soon, supra note 22 (exploring

why any federal action would be unlikely).
130. See Alix, supra note 10 (“Like legal pot, online gambling isn’t going away, and the
money involved is expected to be phenomenal.”).
131. Gabriel J. Greenbaum, What to Do with All This Green: Using Casino Regulations As
A Model for Cannabis Industry Banking, 58 WASHBURN L.J. 217, 218–19 (2019).
132. See 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11 (2020) (making cannabis illegal); see also Professional and
Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 (“PASPA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3704 (2018) (making
sports betting illegal).
133. 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11.
134. Greenbaum, supra note 130, at 219–20.
135. See H.R. 1595, 116th Cong. (2019) (providing a safe harbor for any bank which
unintentionally assists in money laundering).
136. See 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11 (making cannabis illegal to own under federal law, which
means the market could be shut down at any time). But see Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct.
1461, 1484 (2018) (ending federal regulation of sports betting).
137. 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11 (making cannabis illegal to own under federal law, which means
the market could be shut down at any time).
138. Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct 1461, 1484 (2018).
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With cannabis still illegal at the federal level, there are numerous
risks banks may face when seeking to do business with a cannabis
dispensary even when that dispensary is operated according to state
law.139 All proceeds associated with cannabis are illegal under antimoney laundering statutes, regardless of whether the proceeds are
generated in a legal manner.140 Additionally, cannabis-related assets may
be seized under current federal forfeiture law, both in civil suits and
criminal cases. 141 Finally, banks face a “reputational risk” as a result of
being subject to seizures and forfeitures.142 In spite of all of these risks,
some banks have started to process state cannabis tax revenue. 143
However, banks have moved forward cautiously and analyzed each state
independently, weighing the current risks against the long-term benefits
of the cannabis industry.144
Instead of sitting on the sidelines, banks should focus on
evaluating the state-specific protections that make working with sports
betting operators less risky.145 Due to the fact that sports betting has also
unfolded in a similar state-by-state fashion, banks can examine each state
individually.146 In fact, the state-by-state analysis will be more effective
for sports betting, as there are no overarching federal regulations causing
issues, as is the case regarding the cannabis industry. 147 Because the
pressure put on the cannabis industry was due to the active federal
probation and uncertainty surrounding enforcement, states can do little to
assuage banks. 148 Banks’ biggest uncertainties in regards to sports betting
stem from the BSA and the potential fines that may be levied if a bank is
found to have violated the law.149 In spite of this uncertainty, it remains
possible for sports betting to operate without breaking federal law,

139. See Katherine P. Franck, Cannabis Reform: High on the Banking Agenda, 24 N.C.
BANKING INST. 163, 167 (2020) (detailing the risks banks face such a money laundering suits
and forfeiture).
140. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–1957 (2018).
141. Franck, supra note 139.
142. Id.
143. Alix, supra note 10.
144. See id. (explaining that only some states have been chosen to receive bank support as
well as the fact that future benefits may be too much for banks to ignore).
145. See id. (explaining how sports betting is growing and will likely continue to develop
at the state level).
146. See id. (explaining that banks will approach online gambling the same way they
approached marijuana).
147. See Franck, supra note 139 (exploring some of the risks the cannabis industry faces
from broad federal laws concerning money laundering and forfeiture).
148. See id. (suggesting federal actions so that banks may support the cannabis industry).
149. Prior, supra note 11.
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whereas the cannabis industry is unable to do that because of the federal
ban on cannabis proceeds. 150
V. BEST PRACTICES FROM COMPANIES AND STATES IN SPORTS BETTING
Currently over half of the country has legalized sports betting,
including three states in the November 2020 election.151 In spite of this,
many banks are still waiting for federal guidance. 152 Much of this
hesitation stems from a fear of being targeted by federal authorities for
unknowingly assisting in financial crimes, primarily money
laundering.153 This fear is founded on recent history, as banks that did
business with casinos were consistently targeted by federal law
enforcement in the past.154 These risks should not stop banks from getting
involved with online sports betting, as they have been mitigated by
legislation155 and industry response.156
A.

Money Laundering Risk Is Mitigated By State Legislation and
Market Diligence

Money laundering involves exchanging money, obtained through
illicit means, such as drug trafficking,157 for something which can later
be exchanged, or “laundered”, for “clean” money which is not
attributable to the illicit activity.158 In the traditional casino context,
illicitly obtained money is converted into is casino chips, which are then
laundered into clean money when the chips are cashed out by the
casino.159 While money laundering is difficult to identify, it is not

150. 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11 (2020).
151. Prior, supra note 11.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Rudegeair, supra note 105 (exploring how banks have begun to bear the brunt of

regulation in typical casinos).
155. See e.g., 230 ILL. COMP. STAT 45/25-25 (explaining some of Illinois protections added
to online sports betting).
156. See How DraftKings Keeps Onboarding Security Swift and Out of Sight, supra note
107 (explaining how DraftKings has sought to protect competitive integrity of sports betting).
157. Dirty money is illegally gotten gains such as money from drug deals. See, Ethan
Baker, How Money Laundering Works in Online Gambling, CASINO.ORG (July 7, 2019),
https://www.casino.org/blog/money-laundering-in-online-casinos/ [https://perma.cc/B9X2HKDK] (“such as the cash proceeds of a drug deal.”).
158. Id.
159. Chips are the currency of casinos. See Rudegeair, supra note 105 (exploring how
money laundering traditionally works).

2021]

ONLINE SPORTS BETTING

523

impossible.160 The brightest warning signs include individuals using
multiple bank accounts to fund betting, adding funds in multiple small
amounts rather than large deposits, wiring money to international
subsidiaries, and wiring funds from accounts not linked with the
individual.161 In particular, wiring funds from many different accounts
has been noted to be an effective tool for the patient money launderer. 162
The risk of being fined for unknowingly assisting in the process of money
laundering remains the biggest motivator for banks to wait for federal law
before engaging in sports betting.163
The first line of defense against money laundering in sports
betting is the sportsbooks themselves.164 Banks need partner sportsbooks
to take precautions so that they do not have a situation where they need
to act as secondary regulators as was the case with casinos historically.165
Currently, many sportsbooks include protections in the process of setting
up a betting account, such as identity verification so that the sportsbook
has at least one person tied to the account.166 Additionally, some
sportsbooks follow standard know your customer “guidelines.”167
Recently, sportsbooks have also taken strides to ensure that these
added protections do not cause any interruption on the customer’s
behalf.168 DraftKings has begun using a “data-driven” approach to
enrollment which has allowed it to streamline the process of registering
new users.169 This approach entails verifying personal information the
sportsbook has collected through outside firms before turning to the
customer to seek any information they were unable to collect.170 This
makes it easier for customers to join, as they only need to fill in any
160. See Joseph Rillotta, Beyond the Sar-c: Best Practices for Gaming Companies to
"Know Their Customer" and Avoid Organizational Money Laundering Liability in the PostSands Climate, 5 UNLV GAMING L.J. 145, 147–49 (2014) (listing what federal prosecutors
think are best ways to identify money laundering).
161. See Id. (Reciting factors listed by federal prosecutors in the wake of the Las Vegas
Sands scandal).
162. Baker, supra note 156 (“[the] process is even harder to detect if the criminals are
patient enough to break their loot down into small amounts.”).
163. Prior, supra note 11.
164. See How DraftKings Keeps Onboarding Security Swift and Out of Sight, supra note
107 (exploring a few of the ways DraftKings tries to minimize illegal activity).
165. See Rudegeair, supra note 105 (exploring how banks have begun to bear the brunt of
the regulation when working with typical casinos).
166. How DraftKings Keeps Onboarding Security Swift and Out of Sight, supra note 107.
167. Ian McKendry, Are Fantasy Sports Sites a Money Laundering Haven, AM. BANKER,
(Oct. 09, 2015, 3:00 PM) http://www.americanbanker.com/news/law-regulation/are-fantasysports-sites-a-money-laundering-haven-1077178-1.html [https://perma.cc/C2HK-VHAR].
168. How DraftKings Keeps Onboarding Security Swift and Out of Sight, supra note 107.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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missing information at the end.171 Changes such as this enable more
customers to join than would otherwise be the case, due to the fact the
registration process is able to continue moving quickly.172
Beyond just the industry itself, individual states have also begun
to create systems to combat money laundering. 173 Some of these
practices, such as limiting online sports betting to only occurring within
the boundaries of the specific state, have already become the standard. 174
For the most part, however, states have gone their own way in deciding
what they think would best suit the needs of their citizens. 175 Although
the regulatory structure differs between states, Illinois and Rhode Island
have adopted several effective measures to combat money laundering
which can serve as a template for banks to consider best practices for state
action in combatting money laundering.176
Illinois requires that all mobile sports bettors first register their
accounts in-person at an authorized sports betting parlor.177 This ensures
that a single person cannot create multiple accounts with a single
sportsbook and helps to link the flow of money to the required person. 178
Indeed, in the past when casinos have been targeted by money launderers
the have often used multiple accounts to fund the gambling.179 This is
done so that it is more difficult to track whether or not the money was
ever the proceeds of illicit activity.180 By linking accounts to a single
person, a sportsbook ensures that whenever a bet is placed, there should
only be one individual on the other end.181

171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1484 (2018) (striking down the federal law

and leaving the issue up to the states).
174. See e.g., 230 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/25-25 (2019) (requiring certain protections for
online sports betting to ensure it occurs within the state).
175. Compare 230 ILL. COMP. STAT 45/25-25 (putting sports betting under the Illinois
gaming board) with 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN § 42-61.2-16 (2020) (adding sports betting to the
domain of the Rhode Island Lottery).
176. See 230 ILL. COMP. STAT 45/25-25 (providing all the protections Illinois requires from
sports betting); see also 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN § 42-61.2-16 (adding sports betting to the
list of activities under the eye of the Rhode Island Lottery).
177. 230 ILL. COMP. STAT 45/25-25.
178. See Chris Grove, In-Person Registration For Online Sports Betting, IDEVELOPMENT
& ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, https://ideagrowth.org/impact-of-in-person-registration/
[https://perma.cc/D9WR-BC5E] (last visited Sept. 26, 2020) (finding that is in-person
registration was not used, over half of respondents would create multiple accounts).
179. Rillotta, supra note 159, at 148.
180. Id.
181. See 230 ILL. COMP. STAT 45/25-25 (placing restrictions on sports betting accounts to
promote public safety).
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Rhode Island also requires in-person registration,182 but sets itself
apart by giving oversight powers to its regulatory body that are much
broader than other states’ centralized regulatory authorities.183 The
Rhode Island Lottery (“Lottery”) is the state’s central gaming authority,
with powers over the state operated lottery as well as all sports betting.184
The Lottery may suspend online accounts, suspend account withdrawals,
and require the production of statements of account activity.185 These
provisions give the Lottery unparalleled access to accounts, which helps
to enforce and maintain compliance.186 Structures like the one in Rhode
Island should be appealing to banks, as it gives the state greater authority
to investigate the betting companies which in turn mitigates the risk of
money laundering occurring. 187
B.

States Are Imposing Sweeping Oversight Laws on Sports Betting
Operators

In 2014, when PASPA confined legal gambling to only a few
states, federal regulators began to push banks to be more preemptive in
investigating their casino partners.188 Unsurprisingly, banks have
opposed this push to take a more active role in monitoring their business
partners, as there is no benefit to the banks and they are still punished
even if they do everything correctly.189 Additionally, acting as the
enforcers of other businesses took up banks’ resources.190 However, at
the state level, regulations on sports betting often put pressure on the
sportsbook itself rather than any bank they might be doing business
with.191
States, such as Nevada, placed the burden of regulation and
stamping out match fixing on the bookmakers, rather than the banks.192
182. 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN § 42-61.2-16.
183. See id. (allowing for the lottery to mandate an audit of any account); see also, 230 ILL.

COMP. STAT 45/25-25 (providing grants of authority to regulatory institutions created by the
state).
184. 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN § 42-61.2-2.4.
185. Id. § 42-61.2-16.
186. See id. (providing access to the private accounts in order to ensure compliance).
187. See id. (providing access to the private accounts in order to ensure compliance).
188. Rudegeair, supra note 105.
189. Id.
190. See id. (“bank executives grumble about the extent of the work they have to do for
government enforcement agencies now, and the penalty for failure.”).
191. See Legal US Online Sports Betting and Mobile Betting Apps, supra note 63 (listing
all the different ways in which sports betting is regulated).
192. Andrew Smith, Why Georgia Should Get Off the Bench and Profit from the
Inevitability of Sports Betting, 36 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 845, 856 (2020).
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In particular, the state mandates submissions to the central gaming
authority of suspicious activity that is observed by any employees. 193
While there could be problems with such a practice in online betting—
namely the fact that employees will not be able to see the players, Nevada
has gone one step further and implemented the regulation against all
sportsbooks, no matter if they are online or in person.194 This means that
online sportsbooks will still be required to track the amounts being added
to accounts and from which sources, even if they are not physically
present when such activity takes place. 195 Finally, Nevada has added
some actions that are defined as suspicious, such as betting over $5000
in the aggregate.196 Protections such as this should not impose additional
work on the banks for the sportsbooks, as the onus is on the sportsbooks
to make all mandatory reporting.197 Because of the BSA requirements,
banks will still be at risk of penalty if they do not conduct their own due
diligence.198 These requirements will reduce the risk of money
laundering occurring in sports betting, the primary motivator for banks
seeking to keep out of the industry.199
C.

Potential for a Safe Harbor

Despite everything states are doing to mitigate the risk of money
laundering they will never be able to fully eliminate the risk, as federal
law will still punish any bank which facilitates money laundering. 200
Because of this, many banks have decided that sports betting is too risky
due to the federal fines associated with money laundering.201 This “derisking” is an issue that has stemmed from the lack of a safe harbor for
banks that unknowingly assist in money laundering, which in turn
prevents growing industries from accessing much needed funds.202 There
have already been several proposals that would give banks such a safe

193. NEVADA ADMIN. CODE 22.121 (2020).
194. Id.
195. Byron, supra note 104.
196. NEV. ADMIN. CODE 22.121.
197. Id.
198. See 12 U.S.C. § 1951–1959 (2018) (requiring penalties for all violations regardless of

whether or not the bank was at fault).
199. Prior, supra note 11.
200. 12 U.S.C. § 1951–1959.
201. Prior, supra note 11.
202. Sharon Levin, AML and Sanctions Reform: A Safe Harbor Proposal, THE CLEARING
HOUSE,
https://www.theclearinghouse.org/banking-perspectives/2016/2016-q3-bankingperspectives/articles/aml-safe-harbor [https://perma.cc/5FKU-M57W] (last visited Dec. 26,
2020, at 3:37 PM).
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harbor which could provide the basis for any future legislation.203
However, while a safe harbor would be the best case scenario for banks,
federal action seems unlikely in the foreseeable future.204 Because of this
banks should focus on the protections that are available, rather than
waiting on protections that may not come for many years. 205
VI. CONCLUSION
Sports betting is a large and growing industry,206 and banks will
need to address not only whether to accept sportsbooks as customers but
also in what capacity.207 Online sports betting presents a great
opportunity for banks to make money in a rapidly expanding market, that
has tailored itself to avoid money laundering.208 Currently, many banks
have taken the same approach they had with the cannabis industry
towards the sports betting industry and adopted a wait and see
mentality.209 However, there are key differences between the two
industries, and treating them the same could cost banks a valuable
opportunity.210 At the same time, the states have taken it upon themselves
to do their best at enticing banks by limiting the money-laundering risk.211
There is no one state which has created a perfect sports betting
system, but many states have begun to implement smart and prudential
regulations.212 Banks should work with casinos in states that provide
strong centralized gaming boards that have broad mandates to police for
illegal activity.213 Additionally, banks should look to partner with sports
203. See e.g., Amateur Sports Integrity Act, S. 718, 107th Cong. (2001).
204. See Why We Won’t See A Federal Sports Betting Bill Soon, supra note 22 (exploring

the reasons why federal action for sports betting will be slow).
205. See id. (exploring the reasons why federal action for sports betting will be slow).
206. Associated Press, supra note 8.
207. See Wack, supra note 12 (“the large size of the revenue opportunity in sports gambling
could change bankers’ thinking.”).
208. See Rudegeair, supra note 105 (exploring how banks have issues with money
laundering).
209. Alix, supra note 10 (exploring how banks came to interact with the cannabis industry
as well as online casinos).
210. See Holden, supra note 124, at 600 (explaining that high taxes actually decreased
competition).
211. See e.g., 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN § 42-61.2-16 (2020); see also 230 ILL. COMP. STAT
45/25-25 (2019) (providing examples of laws to prevent money laundering in the newly
legalized sports betting market).
212. See NEV. ADMIN. CODE 22.121 (2020); see also 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN § 42-61.216; see also 230 ILL. COMP. STAT 45/25-25 (providing examples of well written laws to protect
banks from the risks associated with sports betting).
213. See 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN § 42-61.2-16 (allowing for the state lottery to investigate
and freeze any transactions).
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betting operators in states where the onus is not on the bank but on the
betting operator to police the transactions, as this should avoid a situation
where the banks are being pushed to regulate the sports betting
operators. 214 The Murphy decision created a wild west of sorts in sports
betting, and banks should begin a state-by-state analysis to find those
which provide the best protection against money laundering rather than
wait for federal intervention.
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